A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES EMPWYED BY LARGE FOOD MANUFACTURERS IN THE 1980s by Ding, John Y. & Caswell, Julie A.
f'\ E.\JJf  fL ~b 
~------------------------------------~--~ 
NE-165 
.  LRRIVATE  STRATEGIES,  PUBLIC POLICIES 
& FOOD SYSTEM  PERFORMANCEl 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE 
RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES EMPWYED BY 
LARGE FOOD MANUFACTURERS IN THE 1980s 
BY 
JOHN Y.  DING and JULIE A.  CASWELL * 
WP-25  NOVEMBER,  1991 
.YlORKING PAPER SERIES 
A Joint USDA Land Grant University Research Project A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE 
RESTRUCTURING STRATEGIES EMPWYED BY 
LARGE FOOD MANUFACTURERS IN THE 1980s 
BY 
JOHN Y.  DING and JULIE A.  CASWELL * 
WP-25  NOVEMBER,  1991 
* John Y.  Ding is Research Assistant and Julie A.  Caswell is Associate Professor, Department 
of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. L 
A Framework for Analysis of Alternative Restructuring Strategies Employed by Large 
Food Manufacturers in the 1980s, John Y.  Ding and Julie A.  Caswell, University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst.' 
Introduction 
The 1980s are very likely to  be remembered as  the Decade of the Deal as  a large number of firms were 
actively engaged in major corporate restructuring through mergers,  acquisitions, leveraged and management 
buyouts, and selloffs.  This wave of activity was facilitated by, among other things, the prevalence of easy 
financing such as junk bonds on Wall Street and relaxed antitrust enforcement during the Reagan administration 
[Clark 1990].  By  the end of the decade, a total of $1.3 trillion had been spent on shuffling assets [O'Neal 
1990].  Food and tobacco manufacturers were among the most active participants in these restructuring 
activities.  Five of the 20 largest mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts (LBOs) made between 1980 and 
1989 involved food  manufacturers.  The LBO  of RJR Nabisco in  1989 holds the record  price tag of $24.7 
billion. 
Interim assessments of the impact of restructuring activities undertaken during the 1980s on corporate 
diversification, firm performance,  and market performance are now appearing in the economics and 
management literature.  This paper contributes to that literature by developing a prototype analytical framework 
for a systematic description and analysis of restructuring patterns among large food manufacturers during the 
1980s.  The prototype analysis includes a small sample of the 10 largest firms of 1990 operating in SICs 20 and 
21  (see Table 1).  This paper differs from much other research in its focus on the cumulative effect of 
restructuring activities over the decade on the firm's portfolio of product lines and activities.  As discussed 
below, much of the analysis to date has been on the outcomes of specific transactions and industry trends rather 
than the overall impact of several such transactions on the firm over a period of time. 
Restructuring and Diversification 
Observers believe the key difference between the corporate restructuring that occurred in the 1980s and 
that attendant to the 1960s merger wave is  in the degree of relatedness between the acquiring and acquired firms 
or lines of business.  The earlier wave is characterized as  conglomerate in nature with firms  making large 
numbers of acquisitions in  lines of business not closely related and, in some cases totally unrelated,  to their core 
businesses.  In  the latter wave,  restructuring is associated with firms selling off unrelated and acquiring more 
closely related  business lines.  In  fact, the  latter wave appears to be largely concerned with undoing the results 
of the previous wave (Porter 1987).  Thus restructuring may  be associated with either increases or decreases in 
diversi fication. 
Researchers  in  industrial organization and strategic management have employed varied definitions of 
diversification.  In  a comprehensive survey of diversification studies, Ramanujam and  Varadarajan [1989] found 
at least five commonly used definitions of diversification.  In  the most general sense,  a diversified firm is one 
which produces a number of different products and services [Needham  1978].  Diversification can be classified 
as  related or unrelated.  According to Salter and Weinhold [1979], diversification is considered related if it 
involves businesses that: 
1)  Serve similar markets or use similar distribution systems, 
2)  Employ similar production technologies, 
"paper presented at the Northeast Regional Research Project 165 (NE-165) Competitive Strategy Analysis in 
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1 Table 1.  Sample Firms Ranked by  Food Sales in  1990. 
FOOD  TOTAL  PERCENT 
COMPANY  SALES  SALES  FOOD 
($ Millions)  ($  Millions) 
PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES, INC.  26,368  44,759  59 
CONAGRA, INC.  17,253  19,763  87 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES. INC.  10,011  10,284  97 
PEPSICO,  INC.  9,992  15,200  66 
COCA-COLA COMPANY  8,900  8,966  99 
IBP,  INC.  8,586  9,129  94 
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY  7,130  7,751  92 
NESTLE HOLDINGS, INC.  6,781  6,969  97 
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY  6,200  6,200  100 
RJR NABISCO, INC.  5,783  12,764  45 
Source:  Food Processing's  1990 Top 100 Food Companies Report and Moody's Industrial Directory (1990). 
3)  Exploit similar science-based research,  or 
4)  Operate at different stages of the same commercial chain. 
Unrelated diversification involves business lines that do not share any of these characteristics. 
The term restructuring as  used  in this paper refers to all mergers,  acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, 
management buyouts, and selloffs by sample firms during the 1980s.  Such transactions change the firm's 
strategic posture in the marketplace and its competitive interaction with rival firms.  More specifically, 
restructuring is defined as  the buying or selling of pieces of the company in an effort to reposition the company 
in its competitive environment.  Depending on the firm's starting position and strategy, restructuring may lead 
to decreased diversification, as  in the case of a conglomerate firm that sells off related businesses, or to 
increased diversification, as  in  the case of a single line firm that acquires related lines of business.  While the 
accepted wisdom is that restructuring activities during the 1980s have resulted in a movement to the middle 
from the ends of the horizontal and vertical diversification spectrums,  the systematic research to support this 
belief is  largely yet to be done. 
Diversification Theory  and Empirical Studies 
Like other features of firms"  behavior, diversification is the outcome of their attempts to achieve certain 
objectives subject to a number of constraints.  Diversification may  be undertaken to exploit efficiency or market 
power opportunities, or because further expansion in  the firm's current markets is blocked by antitrust policy. 
Except perhaps in the latter case,  the degree of diversification is a conscious strategic decision that should have 
a positive impact on firm profitability.  Based on the performance of conglomerates in the 1970s and  1980s, 
however, the devotion of corporate management to profit maximization has been severely questioned.  Most 
prominently, Jensen [e.g., 1989] argues that the public corporation is going into eclipse because it provides 
inadequate discipline to corporate management to  forgo pursuing unprofitable opportunities and disperse excess 
cash to stockholders.  Further, corporate managers may,  from time to time, simply make mistakes in 
formulating diversification strategy [porter 1987]. 
Three streams of research deal with the relationship between diversification strategy and firm financial 
performance:  those in industrial organization, strategic management, and finance [Palepu 1985, Amit and Livnat 
1988].  Early industrial organization research,  including the pioneering studies published by Gort [1%2], 
2 Arnould (1969), and  Markham (1973),  found  no significant relationship between diversification and firm 
performance.  This came as  a surprise since most economists, despite their differing beliefs about the 
motivations for diversification, expected to  find a positive relationship between diversification and firm 
performance.  Partly because of the lack of empirical support for the established theories and partly because of 
the subsidence of the merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s, interest in diversification-performance research 
declined.  Instead industrial organization studies focused on other motives for corporate diversification, such as 
entry into new markets or avoidance of antitrust challenges. 
In  the last  15  years,  most diversification-performance research occurred in  the strategic management 
literature.  Some of these studies found significant relationships between diversification strategies and firm 
performance.  In  particular, studies by Rumelt [1974, 1982], Montgomery [1979], Christensen and Montgomery 
[1981), and  Palepu [1985J suggested that firms  that are diversified into related businesses were usually more 
profitable than other firms.  On the other hand, the finance literature on diversification, including studies by 
Bettis [1981], Bettis and  Hall [1981J, and Bettis and Mahajan [1985], has argued that it was a mistake to 
evaluate the diversification-performance relationship without considering the risk/return trade-offs faced  by  firms 
operating in related versus unrelated businesses. 
Diversification-performance studies generally focus on the relationship between diversification 
(measured either by  subjective schemes of categorization [Rumelt 1974,  1982, Montgomery 1985]), or some 
kind of diversification index as  in  most industrial organization studies [Gort 1962, Gollop and Monahan 1989J 
and performance (measured by  various forms or approximations of firm profitability).  The findings are 
contradictory. 
Some studies suggest that diversification does lead to better performance and that specific types of 
market failures give rise to  specific classes of diversified firms.  For example,  imperfections in product and 
technology markets lead  to  related-diversified firms and capital market failures give rise to unrelated-diversified 
firms  [Lubatkin 1987, Michel and  Shaked 1984, Dundas and Richardson 1980, Weston and Mansinghka 1971]. 
Others argue that diversified firms have little market power with which to influence price, and thus profit, and 
are often less efficient than specialized firms [Backaitis et al.  1984, Salter and Weinhold 1979, Bettis 1981, 
Palepu 1985, Montgomery 1985].  The question that arises is: If  profitability is indeed positively correlated with 
the relatedness of a firm's businesses, why were firms so actively engaged in unrelated diversification?  Studies 
by Mueller [1977] and Ravenscraft & Scherer [1987] suggest that many diversification precipitated mergers and 
acquisitions were not motivated by  pursuit of efficiency or profit but by pursuit of "corporate growth or other 
objectives not directly related to stockholder welfare and economic efficiency [Mueller 1977]."  This is  formally 
analyzed in the literature on firm internal organization, corporate control, and agency costs [Chandler 1977, 
Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama  1980, Aron  1988, Dyl 1988].  Empirical ftndings on agency costs and 
markets for corporate control have been largely mixed and inconclusive [Dyl 1988, Eckbo 1986]. 
One of the important potential benefits of diversification is  the reduction of risk, especially through 
unrelated diversification.  Firms may  diversify to  reduce financial risk and increase survivability rather than for 
the single purpose of profit maximization.  The risk reduction argument has not received proper attention and 
has often been rejected as  a legitimate reason for unrelated diversification [Hill and Jones 1989, Salter and 
Weinhold 1979].  The risk of a security can  be decomposed into two parts:  the "unsystematic" portion which is 
specific to each  company and  the  'systematic" portion which is common to all securities [Salter and Weinhold 
1979].  Critics suggest that corporate diversification can only eliminate the unsystematic portion of total risk and 
the systematic portion is  nondiversifiable.  They argue that the risk reduction and income stabilization objective 
can be achieved by  individual shareholders through portfolio diversification and  that the diversified firm is 
simply duplicating shareholders· diversification efforts [Hill and Jones 1989]. 
Proponents of the risk reduction argument counter that this criticism ignores two fundamental factors. 
First, individual shareholders may  not have the same quality of information as  firms have and  may  be less 
successful in  minimizing the risk of their holdings.  Second,  transaction costs for individual shareholders may be 
high enough to prevent them from diversifying their holdings.  Even if a diversified firm offers no advantage in 
terms of reduced variance per dollar of gross expected return compared to portfolio diversification, 
diversification of productive activities may still offer advantages to management [Needman 1978].  If 
management is concerned with the firm's survival, corporate diversification may be superior to specialized 
operations given the same or sometimes even lower expected earnings. 
3 Bettis and Hall [1981] were one of the first  to  shed some light on the nature of the linkage between 
diversification strategy and risklreturn performance.  Using return on assets and its standard deviation as a 
measure of risk/return performance,  they found evidence of a positive relationship in unrelated diversified firms, 
a negative relationship in related-linked firms,  and no  relationship in  related constrained firms.  Another study 
by  Bowman [1980] investigated a sample of 85  industries using return on equity and its variance as a measure 
of risk/return performance.  He found evidence of a negative risk/return relationship in  more than 60 percent of 
the industries.  A more recent study by  Bettis and  Mahajan [1985] examined the risklreturn trade-off for 80 
large related and unrelated diversified firms.  The results suggest that although related diversified firms 
outperform unrelated diversified firms on average,  related diversification is  no guarantee of a favorable 
risklreturn performance.  In  fact  different diversification strategies can result in similar risk/return performance. 
These findings indicate that diversification may  indeed reduce risk at  the expense of profitability, as industrial 
organiZAtion  theory  predicts.  What is even more interesting is that these findings suggest a well-devised 
diversification strategy could simultaneously reduce risks and increase returns.  Beyond these three studies, 
however,  there has been very little empirical research on the relationship between risk and return.  Out of 56 
diversification studies reviewed by Ramanujam and Varadarajan [1989], only two dealt with risk reduction. 
That empirical studies of diversification-performance linkages have not produced a consensus is not 
surprising given the wide variety of diversification strategies and multiple factors influencing firm performance. 
There are many possible relationships between di~ersification and other aspects of firms' operations, corre-
sponding to differences in objectives and constraints.  Furthermore, it is widely recognized that firm diversifica-
tion strategy has been influenced by the vigor of merger law enforcement [Scherer and Ross 1990, Shleifer and 
Vishney  1990]. 
Restructuring  Theory  aruJ.  Empirical Studies 
Restructuring activities may lead to  increases or decreases in a firm's diversification.  Even where 
restructuring transactions are horizontal in nature, added activity in one line of business will change the balance 
of the firm's overall business and therefore its level of diversification.  In light of the often dismal performance 
of highly diversified finns, careful reevaluation of corporate strategies that emphasize diversification are in 
order.  As  noted above,  it is generally thought that the restructuring that occurred in the 1980s resulted from 
firms'  reassessment of the expansion strategies of the late 1960s and  1970s.  Analyses of the outcomes of 
restructuring activities covering parts of the 1980s have begun to appear [e.g., see Blair et al.  1991].  For 
example,  Porter [1987] examined the diversification records of 33  large U.S.  companies for the years  1950-
1986 tracking entry into new industries through acquisitions, joint ventures, and start-ups.  Using as  a straight-
forward  measure of the success of diversification, whether the acquired firm or line of business was ultimately 
kept by  the acquirer,  Porter found that his results paint a sobering picture:  "On average corporations divested 
more than half of their acquisitions in new industries and more than 60% of their acquisitions in  entirely new 
fields [po  45]."  Porter concludes that many  managers have a poor track record in creating stockholder value 
through diversification. 
Porter argues that most diversification attempts failed because there were simply too many pitfalls. 
According to Porter for an acquisition to be successful,  it must pass three essential tests:  1) The newly entered 
industry must be structurally attractive to the parent firm;  2) The cost of entry must not capitalize all the future 
profits; and 3) Either the new unit or the parent must gain competitive advantage from the link.  Porter argues 
that most diversification attempts of the 1960s and 1970s failed because they did not meet these standards. 
Morck et al.  [1990] suggest that most acquisitions are driven by  the personal objectives of corporate managers, 
not stockholder wealth maximiZAtion.  This is particularly "stressful" because both good and bad managers make 
bad acquisitions.  Good managers make bad acquisitions because they are overconfident and think they can 
manage everything.  Bad managers make bad acquisitions because they cannot make their existing firms work 
and want to try their luck with something new.  Morck et al.  suggest that one way  to correct these mistakes is 
through restructuring.  A study by Williams et al.  [1988] of firm level restructuring activity for 82 
conglomerates over the period 1975-84 supports this view.  Williams et al.  report counts of acquisitions and 
divestitures; measures of changes in relatedness of such transactions to the companies' core businesses; and 
breakdowns for subperiods.  They conclude that during this period managers of conglomerates decreased the 
average number of businesses they managed and increased the relatedness of their remaining lines of business. 
4 Other recently published studies focus on the outcomes of particular classes of transactions undertaken 
during the  1980s, in large part attempting to explain the premia earned by the stockholders of acquired firms. 
Kaplan [1989] examined a sample of 76 large management buyouts (MBOs) that occurred from  1980-86.  He 
found that for the 48 MBOs with post-buyout data cash flows increased significantly and they were associated 
with valuable operating improvements.  Kaplan finds support in  these results for the agency theory hypothesis 
that corporate forms such as MBOs give improved incentives to managers  for good performance.  Interestingly, 
a study by  Bhagat et al.  [1990] reaches a contradictory conclusion based on an analysis of all 62 hostile 
takeovers that occurred from  1984-86 with purchase prices of $50 million or more.  They find that: 
The role of the raiders and MBO boutiques seems to be largely to take diversified firms,  bust them up, 
and sell the divisions to other firms  in  the same business.  Management buyout organizers and raiders 
thus serve as brokers working for the ultimate purpose of increased concentration.  Their goal is  to 
create a temporary organization that facilitates the allocation of assets to  related buyers  ...  The evidence 
is  clear that the goal of divestitures is  typically to realize gains from industry consolidation, not to 
improve performance through an  incentive-intensive organizational form [po  44]. 
Bhagat et al.  further conclude that "hostile takeovers represent the deconglomeration of American business and a 
return to corporate specialization [po 2]."  While differences in transactions analyzed may account for some of 
the difference in findings between the two studies, further data on  the ultimate disposition of business units 
acquired in different types of transactions is needed. 
Measuring Restructuring Activity 
In  describing restructuring activity during the 1980s, the beginning and end points as well as the path 
between them are important.  The contribution of the approach outlined here is  to combine endpoint and path 
analyses.  The approach describes the extent to which particular food and tobacco manufacturing firms have 
become more or less diversified over the course of the  1980s;  the underlying relatedness among a firm's 
retained business lines;  and the level of each firm's acquisition and divestiture activity during the period and 
how it resulted in the observed change in diversification.  While most empirical studies of diversification are 
based on large cross-sectional data sets,  this study uses data from two closely related industry groups: food and 
tobacco manufacturing.  We focus on company histories and overall trends in diversification. 
Measures of  Diversificatioll 
The diversity of a firm's businesses can  be measured by  a number of alternative measures.  Early 
industrial organization economics studies used simple product or industry count indexes to measure the total 
diversity of a firm's operations [Gort 1962].  Most strategic management studies employ categorical measures 
based on a classification scheme developed by  Rumelt [1974].  As  Montgomery [1982] points out, both 
approaches have strengths and weaknesses.  The diversification product or industry count indexes are simple, 
easy to compute, objective, and  replicable.  However, a major criticism of these indexes is that while they do 
reflect the diversity of a firm's operations, they do  not distinguish between related and unrelated diversification. 
Nor do they weight each  line of business based on its importance to the firm.  The categorical diversification 
schemes, on the other hand, are more comprehensive and capture not only the diversity but also the relatedness 
of a firm's operations.  Their drawback is  that they are somewhat subjective, very time-consuming, and difficult 
to replicate.  Recognizing the problems with both approaches Montgomery [1982] concluded that "perhaps 
further work with continuous measures  that distinguish between diversification within and between major 
industry groups will better address this issue. " 
Partly in response to criticisms of early diversification measures,  more sophisticated indexes have been 
proposed that are much more comprehensive than the simple product count approach [Berry  1971,  1979, McVey 
1972, Utton 1977, Pomfret and Shapiro 1980, Gollop and Monahan  1989].  A number of studies [Palepu 1985, 
MacDonald 1985] have applied the so-called "entropy measure of diversification" (also known as the Shannon 
index) which was first proposed by Jacquemin and Berry [1979].  This measure effectively captures three 
elements of a firm's diversity of operations:  1)  the number of product segments in which the firm operates, 
5 2)  the distribution of the finn's total sales across the product segments, and 3)  the degree of relatedness among 
the various product segments. 
The Shannon index addresses a situation in which there are a number of industry groups and within 
each industry group there are a number of industry segments.  Initially for this study, an industry group is 
defined as  a two-digit SIC group and an  industry segment is  defined as a four-digit SIC industry.  If a finn 
operates in a total of N four-digit industries in all  the two-digit industry groups, then the finn's total 
diversification (Cr) can  be measured as: 
N 
CT  = IT (l/P)P; 
iml 
where Pi  is the share of a finn's sales from the ith four-digit industry.  This index not only takes into account 
the number of industry segments in which a firm operates, it also gives weights to each segment according to its 
share in total sales.  In addition, it can be decomposed to reflect the finn's diversification across two-digit 
groups and four-digit industries, respectively.  If  we classify the N industry segments into M  industry groups, 
then C4j  is a measure of diversification among four-digit industries in the jth two-digit group: 
C4j  = II  (~)Pf 
tej  p!  , 
where PI  is  the share of the ith four-digit industry of the jth group in the total sales of the group.  In this study, 
related diversification (C4J will be initially defined as  diversification across four-digit industries within the two-
digit groups SICs 20 and 21.1  For a finn that operates across more than one two-digit group (with SICs 20 and 
21  being counted as  one group), its four-digit level diversification can be defined as the weighted sum of the 
C4j's,  where P' is  the share of thejth group in  the total sales of the firm: 
M 
C4T  = L C4j·pi. 
jal 
Let C;  be diversification across two-digit groups, then according to the definition of the index: 
Furthennore, it can be shown [Palepu 1985] that: 
In  this study, C2 will be used to  measure diversification outside of food and tobacco manufacturing.  C4ft,  a 
component of C.rr,  will be used to measure the relatedness dimension of finn diversification [MacDonald 1985]. 
The Shannon index clearly represents an  improvement over earlier measures of diversification and is 
useful in examining inter-industry, cross-sectional data.  However, we are interested not only in changes in 
IFurther work will use more precise measures of relatedness by relaxing the assumption that all 4-digit 
industries within the 2-digit SICs 20 and  21  are related.  . 
6 diversification indexes over time but also in what underlies a particular diversification pattern.  The Shannon 
index does not incorporate this kind of information on the path between beginning and endpoints or the strategy 
that determined that path.  This insight requires qualitative information on the kinds of businesses in which 
diversified firms in  food and tobacco manufacturing tend to be involved.  This qualitative information can be 
achieved for a relatively small sample such as the  10  firms selected here.
2  Our research design incorporates 
industry counts, use of the Shannon diversification index,  and descriptive and quantitative information on sample 
firms' acquisition and divestiture histories. 
Data Sources 
Data for the study come from a number of sources.  The ten firms in the sample are selected from 
Food Processing's annual Top 100 Food Companies Report.  The ranking of the sample firms is based on the 
firms'  1990 food sales, not total sales.  Because of the extensive restructuring activities that occurred during the 
1980s, some of the sample firms were not in the Top 10 at the beginning of the decade.  Many moved into the 
Top 10  through mergers and acquisitions (e.g., ConAgra, Philip Morris).  Other firms were in the Top 10 at 
the beginning of the decade but dropped out due to being acquired (e.g., Kraft, General Foods, Nabisco Brands) 
or because of relatively slower growth (e.g., CPC International, Ralston Purina). 
Industry participation as  measured by the number of 4-digit SIC industries a firm operates in  is 
obtained from the Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations (1980, 1990).  Information on firms' 
restructuring histories is collected from a number of sources,  including Moody's Industrial Directory (1990), the 
Food Institute Report (1984-1990), the Wall Street Journal,  the Merger Data Base of the Food Marketing Policy 
Center at the University of Connecticut, and Mergers  & Acquisitions.  These sources provide the following 
information:  1) a listing of the acquisitions and divestitures made by firms over the ten-year period, 2)  the 
kinds of businesses/products involved in these transactions, 3)  some indication of the strategic considerations of 
divesting/acquiring firms,  and in some cases 4)  information on terms of the transaction (e.g., sale price, method 
of payment).  The Compustat Business Segment tape will be used to compute Shannon indexes. 
Restructuring Activity Among the Top 10  Food Manufacturers in the 1980s 
The average levels of diversification among leading food manufacturers increased continually between 
1919 and  1972.  But the trend slowed and stabilized between  1972 and 1977 [MacDonald 1985].  Of particular 
interest here are MacDonald's measures of diversification patterns among the top 100 U.S.  food manufacturing 
firms between 1950 and 1977.  By  all measures,  the level of diversification increased between 1950 and 1972. 
A number of factors contributed to the increase,  including the fact that many relatively specialized firms began 
to produce other products within food manufacturing.  By  1972, most leading food manufacturers were widely 
diversified within the food industries.  At the same time, some large conglomerates had diversified into food 
manufacturing.  MacDonald found that the level of diversification among food firms of all size classes stabilized 
between 1972 and 1977.  A number of explanations were offered for this stabilization.  By the early 1970s, 
many of the firms that had been drawn into the merger and acquisition wave of the 1960s had time to  reassess 
their diversification moves and recognize that they were not in the firms'  best strategic interests.  Also during 
the 1970s, many conglomerate firms that had entered the food industries during the 1960s began to divest their 
food interests.  By the end of the 1970s, conglomerates such as ITT, LTV, RCA, and Gulf & Western had 
divested most of their food manufacturing businesses. 
Here we report on restructuring trends for the  1980s.  Data availability prevents us  from calculating 
Shannon index results at this time for the  10 sample firms.  We report preliminary results on an industry 
participation index and a categorical scheme based on qualitative analysis of firms' acquisition/divestiture 
histories.  The industry participation index is a count of the number of 4-digit SIC industries in which each firm 
is  involved in 1980 and 1990, a net change count for the period, and counts of the number of 4-digit SICs added 
and deleted during the 1980s within and outside food  and tobacco manufacturing (SICs 20 and 21).  For the 8 
firms for which full  data is currently available, Table 2 shows that the firms are evenly divided between those 
that had positive net changes in  the number of 4-digit industries operated in and  those that had negative changes. 
2'fhe full  study will use a sample of the 100 largest food and tobacco manufacturers. 
7 Table 2.  Changes in  4-Digit SIC  Industry Participation,  1980-1990. 
COMPANY  # SIC  # SIC  NET A  +SIC w/i  -SIC w/i  +SIC 
(1980)  (1990)  20 &  21  20 &  21  OUTSIDE 
PHILIP MORRIS  15  12  -3  8  2  2 
CONAGRA  12  15  3  7  4 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH  5  6  1  2  2  2 
PEPSICO  8  6  -2  1  0 
COCA-COLA  6  4  -2  3  0 
IBP 
ADM  6  11  5  4  2 
NESTLE 
CAMPBELL SOUP  7  6  -1  1  2  0 
RJR NABISCO  4  13  9  10  0 
Source:  Moody's Industrial Directory,  1980 and  1990. 

























1982  1987 
(percent Food Sales) 
30  50 
76  73 
93  89 
71  71 
100  84 
100  94 
100  91 
100  97 
100  100 



















45 The companies with positive net changes include ConAgra, Anheuser-Busch,  Archer Daniels Midland, and 
RJR/Nabisco, while those operating in  fewer 4-digit industries include Philip Morris, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, and 
Campbell Soup.  Net changes, however,  mask some differences in underlying patterns of change in industry 
participation.  Philip Morris, ConAgra, Archer Daniels Midland, and RJR Nabisco all increased the number of 
food  industries in which they participated but only Philip Morris' increase in food industry participation was 
accompanied  by  a substantial decrease in  participation in  industries outside of food and  tobacco manufacturing. 
All  the other firms showed little change in  unrelated diversification. 
A rough measure of the impact of changes in  industry participation on the overall relatedness of a 
firm's businesses can be seen  in  trends in  the percent of the firm's total sales that are in  food  (SIC 20).  These 
percentages are shown in Table 3 for  the Top 10  firms for  1977,  1982,  1987, and  1990.  Four of the  10 
companies began and ended the period from  1977-1990 with over 95 % of their sales in  food,  although 2 of 
these companies (Anheuser-Busch and Coca-Cola) had significant decreases and then increases in their food 
specialization during the intervening years.  ConAgra, IBP, and Archer Daniels Midland began the period with 
100 % of their activity in food and  became somewhat less specialized by the end of the period.  Meanwhile, 
PepsiCo also became somewhat less specialized in food,  beginning from a more diversified base.  The 2 tobacco 
companies, Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco, show the most marked pattern of change with their participation in 
the food industry growing very significantly.  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the movement between 1980 and 1990 
for the 8 firms for which data are currently available in terms of the number of SIC 20 and 21  industries 
engaged in and the percent of sales in  food. 
Table 4 shows data on the number of acquisitions and divestitures and their value made by the 10 
sample firms during the 1980s.  Based on this data and company histories presented in the Appendix, the 
sample firms'  restructuring experiences can  be characterized by a categorical scheme.  An examination of this 
information suggests a four-way classification: 
1.  Firms that remained quite specialized over the period.  mp is the only finn in the sample that 
fits this category. 
2.  Firms that remained quite diversified within related food industries but had little participation 
in  unrelated diversification.  These firms did not experience much restructuring during the 
1980s.  They include Anheuser-Busch,  Coca-Cola (except for its foray  into the entertainment 
business), and Campbell Soup.  Nestle and PepsiCo also belong in  this group, although 
PepsiCo's large restaurant  business makes it  less specialized in  food  manufacturing. 
3.  Firms that increased  their related diversification within the food  industries and modestly 
increased their unrelated diversification outside food.  This group includes ConAgra and 
Archer Daniels Midland. 
4.  Firms that greatly increased their related diversification within the food  and tobacco industries. 
This group includes the 2 tobacco firms,  Philip Morris and RJR Nabisco.  In Philip Morris' 
case,  this restructuring was accompanied by  significant exit from industries outside food and 
tobacco manufacturing.  RJR Nabisco's restructuring is still underway so characterizing its 
actions at this point may  be somewhat premature. 
This classification suggests that no single restructuring scenario characterizes the experience of leading food 
firms in the 1980s.  Half of the firms  were in  fewer 4-digit SICs in  1990 than in  1980 but the other half were in 
more.  Most remained highly centered in  the food  business while the two tobacco firms  in the sample diversified 
further into this business.  Significant exit from 4-digit SICs outside of food and tobacco manufacturing did not 
occur for most companies largely because many began the period with low levels of unrelated diversification. 
Thus the accepted wisdom about the nature of restructuring activities among large firms  in  the 1980s appears to 
be only half true for large food companies.  While these firms in general concentrated on related diversification, 
this concentration was not coupled with widespread shedding of unrelated business lines. 
9 Figure 1.  Number of SIC 20 and  21  Industries and  Percent of Sales in Food, 1980. 
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11 Table 4.  Summary of Firm Acquisition and  Divestiture Activity,  1980-1990 (Preliminary Data). 
Acquisitions  Divestitures 
COMPANY  #  Sales(*)  Price (*)  #  Sales (*)  Price(*) 
(000)  (000)  (000)  (000) 
PHILIP MORRIS  15  $18,910,118  (3)  $18,906,000  (5)  10  $120,000  (2)  $910,000  (2) 
CONAGRA  61  $16,141,884  (27)  $18,349,462  (27)  2  NA  NA 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH  10  $1,114,000  (1)  $1,899,000  (4)  6  $80,000  (1)  NA 
.....  PEPSICO, INC.  20  $910,262  (5)  $4,378,500  (9)  4  NA  $526,000  (2) 
tv  COCA-COLA  29  $2,182,652  (6)  $4,905,700  (11)  14  NA  $315,000  (2) 
IBP  5  NA  $2,500  (I)  NA  NA 
ADM  24  $683,540  (6)  $62,700  (2)  NA  NA 
NESTLE HOLDINGS  10  $6,316,300  (6)  $56,300  (1)  9  NA  NA 
CAMPBELL SOUP  36  $729,500  (13)  $5,500  (1)  9  $79,000  (2)  NA 
RJR NABISCO  11  $6,431,091  (3)  $5,883,100  (4)  37  $340,000  (3)  $1,608,500  (9) 
(*)  Number of transactions with value data. 
Source:  Moody's Industrial Manual [1990], Food Institute Report [1983-1990], and Standard and  Poors Million Dollar Direclory [1982-1990]. Appendix.  Case Histories of Sample Finns. 
ANHEUSER-BUSCH COMPANIES,  INC. 
Founded in  1852 by  Eberhard Anheuser, a prosperous soap manufacturer in St.  Louis, and assisted by 
his son-in-law, Adolphus Busch,  the Anheuser-Busch Company is now the nation's largest brewer of light, 
premium, and super-premium beers with  II breweries across the country.  Throughout its 140 year history, 
Anheuser-Busch has taken a relatively conservative approach to growth strategies.  In fact,  the company had 
very much limited itself to the beer industry until the 1970s.  Since the  1970s,  the company has expanded into 
refrigerator cars,  metal containers, corn syrup, starch, and yeast,  all of which are related to  the beer industry. 
During the same period, the company has  made conscious efforts to  move into food products by  acquiring 
Campbell Taggart, the second largest bakery in the U.S., and developing Eagle Snacks, which distributes snack 
food  to bars,  taverns, and grocery and convenience stores.  As part of its long-term strategic marketing plan, 
the company ventured into the entertainment industry.  It has developed theme parks called Busch Gardens in 
Virginia and Florida.  These introduce Anheuser-Busch's name to a new target group, the younger generation 
and their parents.  The company's ownership of the St.  Louis Cardinals also helps to  popUlarize Anheuser-
Busch products with sports fans who are the most loyal beer consumers. 
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND COMPANY 
The company was founded by John W.  Daniels in  18?8 as a flaxseed processor.  Throughout its 
history, ADM has been clearly focused and states it has no intentions to diversify outside food  related 
businesses.  Since its early years the company's methods have been consistent.  They feature strong research 
and development, which emphasizes new production methods and uses for agricultural products, coupled with a 
bottom-line mandate for high performance and cost efficiency.  The company is well positioned in several 
markets because it supplies basic ingredients to a wide range of industries.  It is  the United States' leading 
processor of linseed oil, the fourth largest flour miller, and the largest soybean processor.  In addition to the 
food  industry, it is  involved in the paint, leather, printing, gasoline, paper,  cosmetics, pharmaceutical,  rubber, 
ceramics,  munitions, and insecticides industries.  The company attributes much of its success to  its conservative 
management style.  In 1986, the oilseed operations accounted for 45 % of revenues,  the corn operations 34 %, 
the wheat and flour operations 12 %,  and all others 9 %.  It has quietly become one of the world's largest 
agricultural processors and plans to remain exclusively in the food business. 
CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY 
The Campbell Soup Company was established in  1860 in Camden,  NJ.  In its early days,  the company 
was known as a maker of canned vegetables,  mince meat, jams and jellies, although it did make a variety of 
soups.  The company's luck with soup came in  1899 when one of its chemical engineers successfully developed 
a method of canning condensed soup.  This innovation greatly reduced the cost of shipping and made it possible 
to  make more varieties of soups.  Over the next 50 years the company gradually reduced its canned produce and 
increased canned soups and eventually became the number-one maker of soups. 
Like most other food  manufacturers,  the company began to diversify into other businesses in the 1970s 
and early  1980s.  Some of the acquisitions, such as  Vlasic Foods (a  producer of pickles), Snow King Frozen 
Foods (a producer of uncooked frozen  specialty meats), and Mrs. Paul's Kitchens (a  processor of frozen 
prepared seafood and vegetables).  These acquisitions were largely successful in complementing the company's 
soup business.  Like many other food  manufacturers,  the company was also caught up  in  the merger fever and 
ventured out into unfamiliar grounds.  In  the early  1980s,  the company acquired Annabelle's, a restaurant chain; 
Triangle, a manufacturer of physical-fitness and sports medicine products; and a pet food  manufactu~er.  By 
13 1985, it was clear that these unrelated acquisitions were hurting the company's financial position.  In 1987, the 
company began to sell off the less-successful ventures and eventually got rid of almost all of the unrelated 
businesses. 
During the same period, the company continued to acquire companies that were more compatible with 
its traditional lines of business, including the Open Pit barbecue sauce line, an American olive producer, and 
Freshbake Foods Group PLC, a British producer of frozen  foods.  In short, during much of its history, 
Campbell Soup has been a specialized maker of canned soups and canned produce.  In recent years,  the 
company became more diversified but still remained close to  its traditional lines of business. 
COCA-COLA COMPANY 
In 1886 when Dr John Styth Pemberton concocted a mixture of sugar, water, caffeine, and extracts of 
the coca leaf and the kola nut, he thought he was making a headache remedy.  Instead the resulting syrup 
became the ingredient of the world's most popular soft drink.  A century after its creation, Coca-Cola is  the 
largest soft drink company in  the world.  Prior to  the 1960s, the company had been essentially a one-product 
concern.  In  recent decades,  it  has diversified into such industries as  food  products, entertainment, and clothing. 
The company began to diversify in  1960 when the Minute Maid Corporation merged  with Coca-Cola.  Since 
then the company acquired the Duncan Foods Corporation, Belmont Springs Water Company, and Taylor Wine 
Company.  The company also introduced several new products within its soft drink line and has made numerous 
acquisitions of bottling companies during the 1980s.  In  1981, the company purchased Columbia Pictures which 
the company later sold.  Despite its diversification attempts, the company has stayed close to its core business of 
soft drinks. 
CONAGRA, INC. 
The Nebraska Consolidated Mills Company was formed  in September,  1919.  Seventy years and a 
name change later, ConAgra is  a diversified international company whose products range from agricultural 
supplies such as  fertilizers,  pesticides, and feeds  to prepared gourmet dinners.  The company first started as a 
flour milling firm serving the local Nebraska market.  It soon became known for its rapid,  multi-dimensional 
expansion into other geographical and product areas.  Prior to  the  1980s, the company's competitive strategy 
focused on expanding into markets outside of Nebraska.  In  1942, the company opened a flour mill and an 
animal feed  mill in Alabama.  In  1958, the company built the first major grain processing plant in Puerto Rico. 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, the company developed mills and distribution centers for feed and 
flour in the Southeast and Northwest.  During this period, the company also began to  move into the European 
market by  going into partnership with Bioter-Biona, S.A., a Spanish producer of animal feed  and animal health 
products. 
Because of the cyclical nature of agricultural commodities, the company has always been concerned 
about balancing its cash flows.  To counter the cyclical profit pattern of basic agricultural commodities, the 
company made conscious attempts to  diversify into other businesses.  During the  1960s, the company developed 
poultry growing and processing complexes in Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama and  by  1982, ConAgra took 
over first place in  the chicken industry.  During the  1970s, through a series of acquisitions, ConAgra also 
expanded into agricultural chemicals.  During the 1980s, ConAgra decided that prepared foods were a better 
way to balance cyclical profits in the food  industry.  It acquired a number of seafood processors, including 
Singleton Seafood, Sea-Alaska Products, Trident Seafoods, O'Donnell Usen Fisheries, and Mrs. Paul's Kitchens 
(from Campbell Soup).  Also during this period, the company moved into the red  meat business by acquiring 
Armour Food Company, a processor of hot dogs, sausage, bacon, ham, and lunch meats.  In 1986, the 
company increased its presence in frozen  foods by purchasing the Morton, Patio, and Chun King brands.  In 70 
years,  ConAgra changed from a low-profile flour miller into a producer of basic commodities, and then into an 
acquisition-driven, diversified international food company with interests across the food industry. 
14 IBP, INC. 
IBP began in 1961 as Iowa Beef Packers, with a single beef slaughtering plant in the western Iowa 
town of Denison.  Within a few years,  IBP helped to revolutionize the meat packing industry by pioneering 
boxed beef, a practice which greatly imprOVed  the efficiency and reduced the cost of beef processing.  Business 
expansion was achieved through both acquisitions and internal growth.  Most of its early acquisitions were in 
the four midwestern states of Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, and South Dakota.  Restricted by an antitrust 
challenge from further expansion in those four states, IBP expanded into Texas, Kansas,  Illinois, and the Pacific 
Northwest during the 1970s.  In  1981, IBP was purchased by  Occidental Petroleum Corporation, the giant 
energy conglomerate.  With financial backing from its parent, IBP began to expand into the pork industry and in 
just six years became the world's largest producer of fresh pork.  It was at this time that the company officially 
changed its name from Iowa Beef Processors to IBP, dropping the emphasis on beef.  In  1987, Occidental 
Petroleum sold 49% of its stock in IBP but remained its major shareholder.  Throughout its entire history, IBP 
has built its strength on product and process innovation instead of diversification.  In fact the company has 
never ventured out of the meat processing industry and does not intend to.  It is currently exploring a wider 
variety of products, such as consumer-ready branded meats. 
NESTLE S.A. 
Nestle is  the largest food company in the world.  With about 400 manufacturing facilities on' five 
continents, it has often been called the "most multinational of the multinationals."  Nestle S.A. is a holding 
company for some 200 operating units that manufacture and sell a wide variety of products including tea, 
coffee,  dairy products, baby food,  frozen foods and ice cream,  pet foods, pharmaceutical products, and 
cosmetics.  The company began in 1866 as a manufacturer of condensed milk and milk food for babies.  In 
response to growing demands for its products, the company quickly expanded its operations into European 
countries, Australia and the United States.  During the 1930s and  1940s, the company began to expand into the 
coffee and tea markets.  Its expansion into the food processing industry accelerated in the 1970s when the 
company acquired Libby's and Stouffer's, and developed Lean  Cuisine.  Nestle entered the nonfood business for 
the first time in  1974 when it became a major shareholder in  the French company L'Oreal.  In the late 1970s, 
the company also moved into the pharmaceutical industry through its acquisition of Alcon Laboratories.  During 
the 1980s, Nestle continued its expansion into the milk and coffee markets.  In 1984, it purchased Carnation, a 
U.S. manufacturer of milk, pet, and culinary prodUCts.  In  1985, it acquired Hills Brothers Inc., the third 
largest American coffee firm.  It also continued to expand into the food processing industry by purchasing the 
Baby Ruth; Butterfinger, and Pearson candy lines from RJR Nabisco in 1990.  With its global presence, Nestle 
has by and large restricted itself to the food industry.  Most of its diversification efforts have been based on its 
technological know-how and distributional network. 
PEPSICO, INC. 
Officially established in  1919, PepsiCo is now the second largest producer of soft drinks in the United 
States.  Like Coca-Cola, PepsiCo had been a one-product firm  throughout much of its history.  In the 1960s, 
the company introduced a number of new brands, including Patio, Teem, Tropic Surf, Diet Pepsi, and 
Mountain Dew.  The company's expansion beyond the soft drink market began in 1965 when it purchased Frito-
Lay, a Dallas-based snack food manufacturer.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the company acquired two 
well-known fast food chains, Taco Bell and Pizza Hut and, later,  Kentucky Fried Chicken.  These new 
subsidiaries became major outlets for Pepsi products.  The company also ventured out of the food and drink 
industry and acquired North American Van Lines, Lee Way Motor Freight, and Wilson Sporting Goods.  Most 
of these latter acquisitions eventually failed apparently because the company did not have the managerial 
experience required to run subsidiaries outside the food and drink industries.  The company sold off most of 
these businesses and vowed to stay away from ·unfamiliar territories. •  . 
15 PHILIP  MORRIS  COMPANIES, INC. 
Throughout much of its early history, Philip Morris operated exclusively in the tobacco industry.  Since 
the early  1970s, the public's concern over the health effects of cigarette smoking led to a slowing of demand for 
cigarettes.  To reduce its dependence on tobacco,  Philip Morris began to diversify into other businesses.  Most 
of its diversification efforts have been based on its superior skills in product positioning and promotion.  It 
1970, it acquired the Miller Brewing Company.  It also diversified into the manufacturing of branded food 
products.  By  acquiring large companies such as General Foods and Kraft,  it became the largest food 
manufacturer in  the U.S.  Its food  business has grown steadily in the last decade.  Even though tobacco still 
generates more profit for  the company than any of its other products, Philip Morris has been consciously 
placing more and  more emphasis on its non-tobacco businesses. 
RJR NABISCO, INC. 
The R.  J.  Reynolds Tobacco Company was established in  1899.  Like Philip Morris, RJR was strictly a 
tobacco manufacturer during much of its early history.  For much the same reasons as  led Philip Morris, RJR 
began to diversify in the late 1960s and continued throughout the 1970s and early  1980s.  Its early acquisitions 
covered a wide range of businesses including food  manufacturing, transportation, oil and gas,  mineral water, 
and soft drinks.  By the mid-1980s, most the company's non-tobacco businesses were in food manufacturing, 
mostly packaged food products including canned fruits and vegetables.  The acquisition of Nabisco Brands in 
1985 made RJR one of the largest food manufacturers in the U.S.  In 1988 the company was bought out and 
taken private by  the investment group Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) in a much-publicized leveraged buyout. 
In order to payoff the debt incurred in  the buyout, the company sold off most its non-food/non-tobacco 
businesses and most of its food  lines not under the Nabisco flagship.  It is expected that the company will shrink 
further into its core tobacco business.  Therefore in the last two years the company has become more 
specialized than it had been in the previous ten years. 
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